DoD inventory management cultural changes and training in commercial practices by Kang, Keebom
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
1998-03
DoD inventory management cultural
changes and training in commercial practices
Kang, Keebom
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/24488
NPS-SM-98-002 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
DoD Inventory Management Cultural Changes 




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD/L) 
The Pentagon 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 




This report was prepared for and funded by The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Logistics. 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
This report was prepared by: 
Keebom Kang ^r~ 
Department of Systems Management 
Reviewed by: 
Reuben T. Harris, Chairman 
Systems Management Department 
Released by: 
David W. Netzer, Associate Provost and 
Dean of Research 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for information Operations and Reports, 121S Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 
March 1998 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Technical Report 
4.     TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
DoD Inventory Management Cultural Changes and Training in 
Commercial Practices 
5. FUNDING 
MIPR No. H4-7-C0166 6. AUTHORiS) 
Keebom Kang 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Department of Systems Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
NPS-SM-98-002 
9.     SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD/L) 
The Pentagon 
Washington, DC  20301-3500 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13.   ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words.) 
In this research we investigate the causes of DoD excess inventory, and difficulties in implementing commercial practices for DoD 
inventory management. Although commercial logistics operations resemble the military's in many ways, simply training in commercial 
practices without understanding fundamental differences between the commercial operations and military operations will not change DoD 
inventory management culture.    DoD's current mission, organizational structure, evaluation, and reward systems promote excess 
inventory.  Focusing on material availability at any cost without regard for high inventory levels leads to conflicting objectives.  DoD 
must review all the fundamental factors of inefficiency including organizational structure, evaluation and incentive/reward systems. DoD 
should not expect inventory managers to accomplish these tasks. This problem is a leadership issue.  The solution must be a top-down 
approach. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
30 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF REPORT 
UNCLASSIFIED 
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF THIS PAGE 
UNCLASSIFIED 
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF ABSTRACT 
UNCLASSIFIED 
20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
SAR 
NSN 7540-01-280-5800 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
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TRAINING IN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the largest single portion of discretionary spending in the federal budget, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) is a prime target for budget cuts. Perceptions of fraud and waste have put DoD 
under tight scrutiny, resulting in many Congressional inquiries and General Accounting Office 
(GAO) audits. Several of these have identified excess inventory as an area needing major 
improvement (see the list of related GAO reports in the References Section). As reported in the 
GAO Report GAO/HR-97-5, DoD's inventory was estimated to be $69.6 billion in 1995. The report 
also states that about half of the $69.6 billion inventory is considered excess, beyond what is needed 
to support war reserve and current operating requirements. 
While military inventory management practices have remained largely unchanged, the past 
thirty years have witnessed a revolution in the way commercial firms manage their inventories. The 
private sector has completely changed its view of logistics and how logistics contributes to 
profitability. As a result, businesses have slashed their on-hand inventories, improved their 
distribution systems, developed long-term relationships with a small number of suppliers who 
produce top-quality products, and improved their bottom lines. 
How can DoD better manage its inventories, get rid of excesses and free up scarce defense 
dollars for recapitalization and other needs? Can DoD apply the same commercial practices, such 
as just-in-time (JIT) inventory, direct vendor delivery (DVD), total asset visibility (TAV), and 
logistics cycle time reduction, that have slashed private sector inventories? 
For many years, numerous GAO reports (see the list in the References Section) have pointed 
out that training in commercial practices would significantly improve DoD inventory management. 
Although commercial logistics operations resemble the military's in many ways, simply training in 
commercial practices without understanding fundamental difference between the commercial and 
the military operations will not change DoD inventory management culture. 
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In this paper we discuss the causes of DoD excess inventory, and difficulties in 
implementing commercial practices for DoD inventory management, followed by conclusions and 
recommendations. 
II. CAUSES OF EXCESS INVENTORY? 
Each of the services and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) define excess inventory 
differently. For example, the Navy definition is any stock that is above the combination of war 
reserves, safety level, expected demand during administrative and production lead times, economic 
order quantity (EOQ), and the reorder point, plus eight years of demand at current consumption 
rates. War reserves are not a significant factor in this model, accounting for less than 1% of Navy 
inventory (DoD's Supply System Inventory Report as of September 30,1995). 
The DLA definition of excess is any stock that is above six years of demand at current 
consumption rates. The DLA model does not consider war reserves, safety stock, economic order 
quantity (EOQ), reorder point, or administrative and production lead times. 
Computing a precise dollar value of excess DoD inventory is extraordinarily complex. 
Besides using different definitions of excess inventory, different accounting systems result in some 
items being valued at original purchase price, some at current price, and some at scrap value. Many 
of these items were purchased years ago or are no longer in production, thus assigning a price to 
them is largely guesswork. 
Our research has uncovered a multitude of causes for DoD excess inventory. We first present 
a list of causes, then discuss each cause with some examples. Some causes are more critical than 
others, yet most of them do not exist in the commercial sector. 
1. Incentives for Item Managers, Supply Personnel and Users 
2. Unpredictable Demand and High Stockout Cost 
3. Lack of Asset Visibility 
4. Government Contracting Regulations 
5. Monopsony and Lack of Competition 
6. Inexperienced Personnel and High Personnel Turnover and 
Multiple Inventory Managers 
7. National Stockpile Requirements and Economic Considerations 
8. Geographically Dispersed Commitments and Separate Service 
Transportation Networks 
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9. Decrease in Requirements and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
10. Lack of Customer Confidence and Receiving the Wrong Consumable Part 
11. Support of Allies 
12. Poor Estimates During Initial Procurement Planning 
13. Demilitarization Costs 
1. Incentives for Item Managers, Supply Personnel and Users 
The commercial sector has the goal of satisfying customers by producing and delivering 
goods that are high quality, low cost, and quickly delivered. Commercial logistics managers are 
rewarded based on efficiency and response time. Although high inventory levels can improve 
response time by making sure goods are always available, they are costly and subject to 
obsolescence and pilferage. In the commercial sector, high levels of inventory are seen as an 
unnecessary, expensive liability. 
In contrast, DoD commanders are evaluated in terms of readiness to perform their operational 
mission. DoD inventory managers are customarily evaluated in terms of how well they support the 
operating forces. Within DoD, this is usually expressed in terms of three measures: 
1. Supply Material Availability (SMA): the percentage of time a requisition 
will be filled when it first hits the system. 85 percent is a typical funded 
SMA goal. 
2. Number of Backorders : the total number of line items for which there are 
requirements, but no inventory in stock in the system. The goal is to 
minimize this number. 
3. Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) or Supply Response Time (SRT): 
the number of days it takes for an average requisition to be filled. The goal 
is to minimize this number. 
DoD inventory managers and operating force supply personnel are trained to focus on these 
criteria, and will use them to express how well they are performing. In fact, all three measures 
improve when large quantities of material are on hand, which can be seen as insurance against 
unforeseen circumstances. Item managers typically perceive that the worst thing they can do short 
of breaking the law is to run out of stock on an item. Table 1 shows how these measures and some 
others that are used result in excess inventories, duplicate requisitions and other inefficiencies. 
Performance Measure Resulting Item Manager Behavior 
Supply Material Availability (SMA) Keep higher inventories 
Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) Cancel documents that cannot be filled 
quickly 
Number of Backorders Cancel documents that cannot be filled 
quickly 
Number of orders shipped Split large orders into many small orders 
Ship small orders first 
Pounds of Material Shipped Ship large or heavy orders first 
Table 1.    Performance Measures That Have Been Used to Evaluate Inventory Managers and the 
Resulting Behaviors 
Other incentives also contribute to holding excess inventories. When an item is excessed, 
Navy item managers often hold it on site until the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office 
(DRMO, a DLA activity) identifies a buyer, since item managers are assessed a transaction charge 
for shipping excess material to DRMO of roughly $33 per line item, regardless of quantity. They 
are assessed the same transaction cost again when DRMO moves the item out of its warehouse. By 
holding the item on site, they are only charged once. In contrast to the Navy, DLA item managers 
do ship excess material to DRMO as they are charged a holding cost for items held in inventory. 
Some senior inventory management personnel do have performance measures that reward 
getting rid of excess inventory. For example, senior DLA inventory managers (GM-13 and above) 
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are graded on Sales to Inventory Ratio and Percentage of Material Considered Excess in addition 
to SMA, ACWT and number of backorders. DLA's goal is to maximize the sales to inventory ratio, 
defined as the total dollar sales from a DLA facility divided by its average inventory. This ratio is 
maximized by holding a small inventory of high demand items. Excess inventory reduces this ratio 
by increasing inventory without increasing sales. DLA tries to minimize the percentage of excess 
material held. 
2. Unpredictable Demand and High Stockout Cost 
Unlike the commercial sector, DoD inventory requirements are driven by national security 
commitments. There is no forecasting model that can predict next year's demand for DoD services. 
The military must be in a constant state of readiness. Many critical components used in DoD 
weapons systems have lead times of over a year that cannot be significantly reduced, even with 
additional funding. Additionally, a wartime inventory model is completely different from that of 
peacetime. As a result, DoD maintains stocks of items it may never use as insurance against the 
threat of a foreign crisis. 
In the commercial sector, the cost of a stockout can be estimated in dollars, derived from a 
combination of lost revenue, back ordering costs, and lost customers. This is not the case for defense 
items. Defense forces must be ready to respond on a moment's notice to a crisis anywhere in the 
world. The cost of running out of stock of an item might be measured in lives, perhaps even 
thousands of lives. DoD's high stockout cost drives inventory levels of many items higher. 
3. Lack of Asset Visibility 
Many inventory excesses are due to a lack of total asset visibility. Individual service 
inventory information systems cannot access information on similar items managed by different 
services. For example, the Navy cannot read information on the DLA's Standard Automatic 
Materiel Management System (SAMMS) database, the Army or the Air Force databases. This 
results in redundancies, where inventories of joint service items are maintained by both services. 
For example, 21 percent of the Navy's weapons system support items are multiple use; the 
corresponding figures are 43 percent for the Army, 34 percent for the Air Force, and 73 percent for 
the Marine Corps. It is quite conceivable that a service may buy an item which another service is 
holding in a warehouse unused (Department of Defense Joint Staff, 1996, p. 5). For example, the 
GAO found 69 modular radio transmitters owned by the Army and classified as excess stored at 
Warner Robbins Air Force Base. These are dual use USA/USAF radio components, valued at 
approximately $16,000. The Army had not made these items available, and the USAF had not 
attempted to obtain disposition authority. (GAO/NSIAD-95-64, 1995, p. 9) 
Current inventory management information systems do not track high cost repairable 
components through the complete repair cycle in a real-time manner or track the actual status of 
material being contracted for. The lack of asset visibility is one of the major causes of long turn- 
around times that not only increase unnecessary pipeline inventory, but deteriorate combat readiness. 
The services are making a significant effort to improve JTAV. Without JTAV, you cannot 
manage what you do not know you have. The Army is the lead service for JTAV, whose goal is to 
provide interoperability among currently stove-piped inventory systems and to facilitate 
consolidation of stock points. When fully implemented, JTAV will provide asset visibility from the 
factory to the foxhole. Inventory managers can then reduce total inventory and cost, while 
improving response time. JTAV will improve customer confidence in the supply system. 
Operational units will ultimately be able to electronically track requisitions all the way to the factory, 
making their supply personnel less likely to hoard items or order multiple times for the same 
requirement. 
4. Government Contracting Regulations 
Government contracting is quite different from commercial sector contracting and contributes 
to higher DoD inventory levels. Government contracting does not exist merely to buy goods for the 
government. It also tries to ensure equity in contract awards, and to promote socio-economic goals. 
Unfortunately, the objectives of government contracting frequently conflict with the concept of 
efficiency, and preclude the adoption of commercial logistics practices. Under the Competition In 
Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), government 
contracting operates on the premise of full and open competition. This essentially means that every 
contract is open to any firm that desires to bid on it. While competition in itself is desirable in 
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producing better quality at a lower price, the government approach to competition can be deleterious. 
Since most government contracts are awarded individually, the length of time required to complete 
them does not decrease over time. This process is quite long, as it involves determining the 
requirement, setting specifications, writing the contract, soliciting and evaluating bids, awarding the 
contract, and dealing with protests. Despite recent reform under the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FAS A) of 1994, the tremendous volume of paperwork and regulations involved 
in government contracting are significant barriers to reducing cycle time. Consequently, inventory 
levels are higher to compensate for longer replenishment times. 
The concept of full and open competition on every bid does not give adequate weight to a 
contractor's past performance in technical merit, reliability, and ability to deliver on schedule. As 
long as a firm can barely meet the minimum requirements to produce an item, it cannot legally be 
prohibited from bidding. A firm's past willingness to cooperate in resolving disputes and 
ambiguities is rarely considered as an evaluation factor (DSMC, 1991, p. 3-4). The government 
cannot boycott uncooperative companies or place most of its business with more responsive firms. 
As a consequence of these factors, there is no incentive for a vendor to provide the best product or 
service. Although the government has a concept called best value which states that factors other than 
price should be considered in making a source selection, many government contract awards are still 
price-driven. This is penny wise and pound foolish, because added reliability or quality may well 
be worth a slightly higher price. FASA emphasized best value as an attempt to put common sense 
back into the procurement process. The full impact of FASA has yet to be felt. 
Government regulations dictate that a firm must offer its best customer price to the 
government. This indirectly reduces quality by limiting competition. The problem with this idea 
is that firms give their best customer price based on a mutual relationship of long-term commitment 
and cooperation. The government demands to be treated as a best customer without being willing 
to behave as one (DSMC, 1991, p. 5-4). 
Delays in payment and litigation are also an obstacle. The government not only demands 
the lowest price and resultant lowest profit margin, it is also frequently the last customer to pay, and 
the most likely to initiate litigation. Given this situation, it is understandable why many firms refuse 
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to bid on government contracts, even if they could supply better quality products at lower prices than 
the eventual contract winners. (DSMC, 1991, p. 4-4) 
Another way that the government reduces competition is by insisting on far more information 
than the commercial sector. The government generally requires more documentation, such as user 
and maintenance manuals and schematic drawing packages, than is normally produced with 
commercial products. Generating these documents is usually a distraction for the supplier, since 
people are diverted from their usual work activities to develop them. Additionally, they are reluctant 
to provide detailed technical data about their products for fear of revealing competitively 
advantageous information. Unless a firm is in business to produce technical documents, requesting 
■them in addition to what is normally provided with a product in different form or format discourages 
vendors from selling their products to the government. (DSMC, 1991, pp. 5-3,4) 
The government will frequently ask for data rights detailed enough to enable it to 
competitively rebid subsequent contracts. Companies with specialized techniques and processes will 
often refuse to bid on government contracts, since they would be giving away trade secrets. The 
government also insists on cost and pricing data for contracts over $500,000. This practice has no 
counterpart in the commercial sector, and in fact this information is often considered proprietary. 
(DSMC, 1991, p. 5-4) In addition, the large volume of paperwork involved in government 
contracting often discourages vendors from bidding. 
Some of the social goals of government contracting result in awarding contracts on the basis 
of race, gender, or company size rather than on quality or past performance. This can result in lower 
quality firms and products being selected. It can also result in higher prices, or in purchases from 
a company in financial trouble that may not be in business when spare parts or technical assistance 
are needed. 
In summary, the limited profit, late payment, lack of commitment for future business, 
requests for proprietary information, and award of contracts based on criteria other than price and 
quality all inhibit bidders. By reducing the number of competitors, the government indirectly 
reduces the quality of items it purchases. The lack of follow-on business means there will be high 
variability between an item bought on one contract and the same item bought on a subsequent 
contract. If a delivered item is substandard, it may be months before a new contract is let to procure 
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the same item.   Consequently, the DoD needs higher inventory levels to compensate for the 
unpredictable quality of items it purchases. 
5. Monopsony and Lack of Competition 
Monopsony is an economic term meaning one customer. For example, DoD is the only 
purchaser for many weapons systems. This is desirable for many defense items, since the exclusive 
use of the latest weapons and their support systems provide the U.S. with a competitive edge on the 
battlefield. Under monopsony, an item's manufacturer is only going to make the item once or 
infrequently. It only makes sense for the manufacturer to want to produce a large lot size and then 
use its production resources on other items. This increases DoD's inventory, since it must buy and 
hold more inventory than it could purchase if the item were commercially available. While 
monopsony is unavoidable for weapons systems, it is not necessary for many secondary items such 
as spare parts, clothing, and medical supplies. However, government regulations and specifications 
have driven many secondary items into this situation. 
Most of the DoD activities are not allowed to use supply systems other than DoD's. It 
eliminates competition, and the inventory managers do not have motivation to take a risk to make 
drastic changes. They are busy to take care of their day-to-day business, and the government rules 
and regulations discourage them to take initiatives in implementing commercial practices that might 
result in significant improvement in the supply system. 
6. Inexperienced Personnel and High Personnel Turnover and Multiple Inventory 
Managers 
In the commercial sector, inventory management personnel typically remain in the same job 
for several years, and often stay in the same location for their entire career. A similar situation exists 
for some DoD civilian inventory managers. However, this is not true in the operating forces. 
Personnel turnover in most operating units is over 25 percent per year. Promotion is rapid compared 
to the private sector. Personnel rapidly rotate through different tasks in order to acquire a variety 
of skills. Consequently, military supply personnel do not develop in-depth inventory management 
experience. 
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7. National Stockpile Requirements and Economic Considerations 
Many DoD excess inventories are held due to National Stockpile requirements. DoD 
warehouses cannot sell or dispose of these items by law. In addition, selling some of these items has 
the potential to devastate commercial and even world markets that would be flooded by the abundant 
supplies in DoD stockpiles. Consequently, the military maintains its excess stocks of these 
commodities. For example, Table 2 shows the amount of various items in National Stockpile storage 
at Defense Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania, that do not have much economic values. 
Commodity Tons in Storage Sq Footage Occupied 
Asbestos 550 42,966 
Chromite Refractory Ore 30,564 158,000 
Lead 663 213,000 
Manganese Ore 72,360 316,000 
Nickel 5,947 71,000 
Talc 470 7,161 
Tannin 13,301 296,060 
Zinc 8,518 71,000 
Table 2. Items in National Stockpile Storage at Defense Depot Letterkenny, PA 
8.   Geographically Dispersed Commitments and Separate Service Transportation 
Networks 
United States international commitments require DoD operating forces to be deployed 
worldwide. It is simply not possible for all users to be geographically close to their suppliers. Also, 
the government's insistence on full and open competition means that any firm in the country, 
regardless of location, can bid on contracts. These factors increase inventory requirements to 
compensate for longer replenishment times. 
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All four armed services and DLA maintain their own transportation networks. These 
separate networks cannot see each other's assets or cargoes. Consequently, economies of scale and 
centralized control are not realized. This arrangement negates the advantages that could be gained 
by maintaining a common logistical system under one command. Inventories must be higher 
because the separate networks are not as efficient as a consolidated system would be. 
9. Decrease in Requirements and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
As requirements for an item decrease and there is enough material on hand to support the 
older, higher requirements, excess inventory is created. A decrease in requirements can result from 
the weapons system being phased out, reliability improvements, a change in operational use, 
reduction in repair cycle time, reduction in administrative or production lead time, or a reduction in 
war reserve requirements. Examples include: 
1) As Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates were sold or transferred to the 
USNR, demand for ship-specific items of the USN decreased. 
2) Strengthening the corners of ALE-39 Chaff/IR buckets increased their Mean Time 
Between Maintenance (MTBM), and reduced requirements. 
3) As some EA-6B aircraft transition from carrier-based to land-based USAF 
support, demand for some items should decrease, because the planes will experience 
less corrosion when they are removed from a salt-water environment, and aircraft 
components will experience fewer failures since they will not undergo the shock of 
catapult launches or arrested landings. 
The overall downsizing of DoD over the past several years has significantly decreased 
demand for many items, as force structures contract and bases are closed or realigned under the Base 
Realignment And Closure (BRAC) process. In addition, closing a base almost always results in 
identifying excess inventory that is not on accountability records. Items from activities that were 
closed or realigned under BRAC do not stratify into excess for two years. This allows some of these 
stocks to be consumed, and provides continuity in the excess management process. Absence of this 
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provision would cause most stocks from BRAC'edactivities to immediately go excess, since closing 
a base increases the supply of material while decreasing the customer base. 
10. Lack of Customer Confidence and Receiving the Wrong Consumable Part 
Operating forces often do not have confidence in the ability of the supply system to support 
them, so they hoard items, and deliberately order more than they need. This stems from a 
philosophy of readiness at any cost. During Desert Shield, when the Army's 24th Infantry Division 
deployed to Saudi Arabia on three weeks notice, it ordered items two and three times for each 
requirement, because they did not have confidence in the system. Since the 24th was in a combat 
zone and had top priority on requisitions, this double and triple-ordering not only created excess 
material in the 24th, it hampered the readiness of subsequently deployed units by taking needed 
items out of the supply system. Units deploying after the 24th followed suit in multiple ordering. 
As a result, approximately 40,000 Sealand containers were sent to the Arabian Gulf during Desert 
Shield/ Storm. About 22,000 of these were never opened. 
A unit may order the wrong part because of a keypunch error, or poor manuals or technical 
assistance. Also, supply activity database may contain inaccurate stock numbers, which would result 
in the wrong part being sent to the unit. If the item was ordered correctly, the ordering activity can 
submit a Report Of Discrepancy (ROD) and receive the correct item at no additional charge. If the 
item was ordered incorrectly, there is currently no practical mechanism for an operational unit to 
recoup money it has spent on this part. 
11. Support of Allies 
Support of our allies often forces DoD to hold items that would otherwise be excess. These 
may be from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts or from regional agreements. A Navy FMS 
example is the A-4 aircraft that has been sold to many nations. The U.S. must retain spare parts to 
meet demand from these aircraft, even though the A-4 is no longer in U.S. service. An example of 
a regional agreement forcing the U.S. to hold excess inventories is 155 mm howitzer ammunition 
for the Republic of Korea (ROK, commonly called South Korea). Although the ROK manufactures 
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this ammunition, they do not store it in sufficient quantities should war break out on the Korean 
peninsula. Therefore, the U.S. Army maintains a stockpile for use by the ROK Army, since ROK 
forces hold 3/4 of the front line. 
12. Poor Estimates During Initial Procurement Planning 
When new weapons systems are fielded, initial estimates of which components will break 
and how often come from the contractor in an Interim Support List (ISL). Unnecessary items on the 
ISL contribute to excess DoD inventories. There is no incentive for the contractor to limit the size 
of the ISL, since they profit from each item on the list. For example, the B-2 bomber ISL contained 
6,000 line items. After two years of operational use, only 400 of the 6,000 had been used at all. 
13. Demilitarization Costs 
Old military equipment must be demilitarized before it can be either sold or disposed. The 
funding comes out of Operations and Maintenance (O & M) dollars, the same dollars the services 
use to pay for current operations. In this time of tight funding, there is simply not enough priority 
to pay for demilitarization of old equipment when the services need the money for today's 
operations. 
An example is old radar components at Defense Depot Letterkenny, PA. The exact 
frequencies these radars generate are classified, so the item must be carefully dismantled in such a 
way that it cannot be reconstructed. Another example at Letterkenny is 3,032 backpack-style riot 
control dispensers. This model is no longer in use, but it cannot be simply thrown away because of 
the potential for terrorist action. This model can be converted to a garden sprayer and then sold on 
the open market, however, the O & M dollars needed to do that are not available. 
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III. COMMERCIAL INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
The commercial sector is fiercely competitive. Companies that do not provide top-quality 
products and service may quickly find themselves out of business. This fierce competition ensures 
that companies keep up to date in capability and remain competitive on price. The logistics function 
in many companies is evaluated by its contribution to the firm's profitability. This leads many 
companies to seek ways to reduce inventory without compromising customer service, since excess 
inventory is expensive to maintain and subject to obsolescence and pilferage. This section discusses 
some of the characteristics of modem commercial inventory management. It is obvious that only 
some of the concepts and techniques commercial firms use to manage their inventories are suitable 
for adoption by DoD. 
1. Just-In-Time (JIT) 
Just-in-time systems minimize a commercial firms' investment in inventory by relying on 
suppliers to only provide materials right before they are needed. The advantages of JIT are: 
1) Elimination of Unnecessary Activities. For instance, receiving activity and 
incoming inspection activity are unnecessary under just-in-time. 
2) Elimination of In-Plant Inventory. Virtually no raw material inventory is 
necessary if materials that meet quality standards are delivered where and when they 
are needed. 
3) Elimination of In-Transit Inventory. Modern purchasing departments address in- 
transit inventory reduction by encouraging suppliers to locate near the plant and 
support rapid transportation of purchases. 
4) Quality and Reliability Improvement. Reducing the number of suppliers and 
increasing long-term commitments to suppliers tends to improve supplier quality and 
reliability. (Heizer and Render, 1996) 
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2. Outsourcing 
Outsourcing is the practice of contracting out non-strategic functions. This allows a company 
to concentrate on its core competencies and let other firms handle ancillary functions. Outsourcing 
often enables a company to maximize its return on investment by better serving its customers, and 
can serve as a barrier to entry for potential competitors. In the past, accounting, payroll, and 
temporary office help were often outsourced. Now logistics is increasingly treated the same way, 
as companies realize that their expertise lies elsewhere. 
The practice of outsourcing may go so far as to create a virtual company, where even the 
employees are temporary hires. Virtual companies have fluid, moving organizational boundaries, 
and rely on a variety of supplier relationships to provide services on demand (Heizer and Render, 
1996, p. 534). Nike, Inc. an example of a company that out sources all of its production. 
Nike Inc. is the largest supplier of athletic shoes in the world. Yet it out sources 
100% of its shoe production and manufactures only key technical components of its 
Nike Air System. Nike creates maximum value by concentrating on preproduction 
(research and development) and postproduction activities (marketing, distribution, 
and sales). (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996, p. 64) 
3. Stable Demand and Low Stock Out Cost 
Commercial logistics practices assumes a stable, predictable demand pattern, which enable 
both supplier and purchaser to effectively plan for the future to maximize productivity. 
Consequently, frequent deliveries in small lot sizes are possible. This minimizes the in-plant 
inventory, and reduces stockage costs. 
The potential penalty of stockout in the commercial sector tends to be low. An example is 
a clothing retailer, who might convince a customer to purchase another item or to backorder the 
desired good, knowing that the logistics system can quickly respond. Substitutability of products 
helps, because a company could use another supplier if one was out of stock. 
However, for some industries in the commercial sector a high stockout cost hampers 
implementation of commercial logistics. For example, an airliner that is not mission capable can 
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cost tens of thousands of dollars per hour in lost revenue, so quick response is a must. Here is an 
example of Boeing and General Electric (GE) inventory practices for jet engines. GE uses normal 
current commercial logistics, holding minimal stock and turning over its inventory ten times per 
year. Boeing uses a more traditional inventory system with high quantities of material on hand, and 
an inventory turnover of .5 per year. In 1992, Boeing's SMA was a consistent 99 percent, with 
delivery occurring in under 24 hours anywhere in the world. GE's SMA ranged from 80-85 percent. 
Customers could not afford the low SMA that GE's commercial logistics practices provided, so they 
have increasingly turned to Boeing. Since 1992, GE has substantially increased its inventory in an 
effort to boost its SMA and keep customers. 
4. Cycle Time Compression 
Cycle time compression is a reduction in the time between when the customer places an order 
and when the customer receives the order. There are several separate transactions involved in this 
process, including order placement and transmittal, order processing, payment, picking the item in 
the warehouse, packing it for shipping, transporting it to its destination, and tracking its status. 
Automating, consolidating, or running these elements in parallel can dramatically reduce overall 
cycle time. Johnson & Johnson (J & J) greatly improved its cycle time as follows (Andel, 1994, pp. 
95-102): 
J & J uses Manugistics, an integrated set of supply chain management applications, 
to help it meet the replenishment demands of all its customers. Using information 
from Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) transmissions, this software links the 
Support Center with J & J's customers and distribution centers. The system is tied 
directly to the company's order management system ~ which includes order 
processing, transportation load building, and sales reporting systems. Information 
from these systems is fed downstream to each of the separate operating units to 
provide decision support throughout the organization. 
By linking all of these functions electronically, J & J has slashed its cycle time, while at the same 
time improving accuracy. A relationship known as Little's Law (Little, 1961) shows that reductions 
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in cycle time will result in equivalent reductions in terms of percentage in pipeline inventories (i.e., 
cycle time and pipeline inventory have linear relationship). For example, a company that can reduce 
the maintenance cycle time by 10% can reduce the pipleline inventory by 10%. 
5. Long-Term Relationships with a Small Number of Suppliers 
Developing long-term, close relationships with good suppliers is essential to success. 
Reduced inventory means more frequent deliveries and a heavy reliance on both the supplier and the 
distribution system. Leading edge companies evaluate suppliers based on quality and their 
demonstrated ability to meet delivery schedules. 
Open, two-way communication is critical to developing the mutual trust and respect needed 
in a long term relationship. Buyers frequently share production or operations schedules with a 
supplier, so the supplier can anticipate buyer needs. Sharing information reduces variability and 
response time. Some companies go further, integrating suppliers directly into their logistics system. 
Support can include training, engineering and production assistance, and even work spaces inside 
the buyer§s facilities. Buyers and vendors consider themselves as colleagues working together. 
This kind of arrangement enables both firms to maximize profit. Contracting costs are virtually 
eliminated, and administrative and inventory costs are sharply reduced. 
According to Heizer and Render (1996), Xerox has cut its number of suppliers by 90 percent, 
Motorola by 70 percent, General Motors by 45 percent, Ford by 44 percent, and Texas Instruments 
by 36 percent. This is a difficult concept for DoD to adopt. The Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) requirements for full and open competition are an obstacle to the government's ability to 
establish and maintain commercial-like relationships with a small number of suppliers. Most 
contracts awards are competed individually with no commitments for future follow-on business 
(DSMC, 1991, p. 3-4). There is often no continuity from one contract to the next, even for the same 
item. 
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6. High Quality Products 
Quality is the ability to consistently meet or exceed customer expectations. Top quality is 
a necessity to realize the benefits of commercial logistics practices. Commercial firms employ a 
variety of techniques to improve quality, including statistical process control to reduce variation, 
continuous process improvement, and Total Quality Management (TQM). Better quality means less 
inventory and a better, easier-to-employ JIT system. Often the purpose of keeping inventory is to 
protect against poor production performance resulting from unreliable quality. If consistent quality 
exists, JIT allows us to reduce all the costs associated with inventory. 
DoD is somewhat hampered in its ability to purchase higher quality items if an acceptable 
item or service is available for less cost. DoD contracting initiatives such as best value contracting 
and being able to take contractor past performance into account on future procurement are examples 
of DoD applying a high quality product philosophy. 
7. Integrated Information Systems 
Information technology is a key part of successful commercial inventory management. 
Companies must know exactly what inventory they have, where it is, and if it is in transit, where it 
is going and when it is going to get there. Leading edge firms focus on integration across supply 
channels to build EDI links with partners, suppliers, customers, and carriers. Information systems 
reduce the need for inventory and eliminate redundancy in procurement. 
8. Centralized Shipping Near to Corporate Headquarters 
To receive the most benefit from a logistics system, it should be centralized near the strategic 
apex of the company, so the firm can integrate logistics into the strategic planning process. 
Centralization enables a company to maintain tight control while consolidating shipments and 
lowering costs. In 1993, the University of Maryland surveyed 20 companies seeking best logistics 
practices and found that all of them had centralized their strategic logistics management function in 
proximity to the corporate center.   This pattern contributed to company-wide planning and 
-19- 
organizational activities. All cited increased control, improved efficiencies, and lowered costs as 
the primary motivations behind their centralization philosophy. 
9. Direct Vendor Delivery 
Direct delivery is another form of a pull inventory system. A manufacturer ships products 
directly to a retailer's store, instead of to the retailer's warehouse. The advantage is that the retailer 
has eliminated inventory holding costs on that item, and only calls for the item to be delivered to the 
store when needed. A disadvantage is that shipping costs will probably increase, since there will 
usually be more Less Than Truckload (LTL) shipments. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following general conclusions can be drawn from the information presented in the 
previous sections. 
1.  Training in Commercial Logistics Practices Is Not the Answer to DoD Inventory 
Management Problems. 
Training in commercial logistics practices alone will not change DoD inventory management 
culture. Inventory management culture is too complex to be changed by simply training in 
commercial logistics. To be effective, it must be coupled with changes in other organizational 
design factors such as reward systems and management control systems. Training is only one of 
many inputs to organizational behavior. Trying to alter a culture by changing only one of these 
factors is usually a wasted effort. 
Most of the causes of excess inventory are unrelated to training. Issues such as a lack of asset 
visibility, lack of customer confidence, support of allies, demilitarization, BRAC, and economic 
considerations have no direct connection to the training of inventory managers. A training program 
in commercial logistics practices, no matter how well constructed, would have little impact on these 
causes of excess inventory, primarily those dealing with uncertainty. However, educating inventory 
managers to understand these causes is important for the long-term. At the operational level, supply 
personnel often lack in-depth knowledge of logistics and supply principles. More training/education 
could alleviate some of the excess inventory caused by hoarding or multiple ordering. 
Several other causes of excess might be affected by training/education, but not necessarily 
training in commercial logistics practices. The consequences of a decrease in requirements for an 
item might be partially averted by training the weapons system program office and inventory control 
point to understand each other's priorities and capabilities. Excess caused by receiving the wrong 
consumable part can be reduced with better on-the-job training of supply personnel in the fleet. 
Excess caused by poor estimates of support required for initial procurement can be alleviated with 
some of the initiatives such as making the contractor responsible for all parts support for the first 
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several years of a weapons system introduction. .This would of course need to be balanced against 
the national security risk involved in carrying a reduced inventory of spares for a first-line weapons 
system. 
The contracting community may benefit from training in commercial logistics practices that 
have potential to reduce excess inventory. Problems resulting from government contracting 
regulations are largely self-inflicted, thus the government has the ability to change its policies to 
reduce the generation and retention of excess inventory. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) of 1994 reduced some of the burdensome requirements of government contracting, making 
it easier to buy quality products and develop long-term relationships. Prime Vendor and Direct 
Vendor Delivery are two initiatives currently underway that can reduce inventory. 
2. Current DoD Inventory Incentives Promote Organizational Effectiveness Over 
System Effectiveness. 
Current DoD performance measures tend to promote high levels of inventory and reflect the 
traditional emphasis on maximum organizational effectiveness. DoD's prime objective has always 
been to maintain combat readiness. Operating forces often do not have confidence in the ability of 
the supply system to support them, so they hoard items, and deliberately order more than they need. 
The evaluation and incentive/reward systems designed under the concept of readiness at any cost 
discourage commanding officers and inventory managers to be efficient by keeping low inventory 
levels.  They simply do not have strong motivation to reduce inventory level, at the risk of stockout. 
3. Many Commercial Logistics Practices May Be Inappropriate for the DoD. 
Because of the tremendous differences between the DoD and the private sector as discussed 
in the previous sections, many commercial practices just will not work in the DoD without 
understanding the DoD-unique management systems. Factors such as unstable demand, huge 
stockout cost, and geographic dispersion preclude the use of many logistics practices that have 
proven so successful in the commercial sector. Many causes of excess inventory are beyond the 
ability of DoD to control. Many of these factors cannot be changed, since they are inherent to being 
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a military entity of a worldwide superpower. For those it can control, DoD is making good efforts 
to improve its systems. Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV), Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD), and 
contracts that make contractors responsible for the first several years of weapons system parts 
support are examples of current initiatives to lower inventories. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following general recommendations will further reduce DoD inventories: 
1. Cycle Time Reduction and Modeling & Simulation (M&S) 
The ultimate goal of DoD inventory management is to maintain the highest level of military 
readiness. The readiness, or operational availability (A0) of a weapon system is defined as, 
.   _ uptime _ MTBM 
0
      uptime + downtime MTBM + MDT 
where MTBM stands for the mean time between maintenance, and MDT, the mean down time. MDT 
includes repair time, and administrative/logistics delay times. Thus the operational availability is 
the fraction of time the weapon system is up or mission capable. The operational availability can 
be improved by increasing MTBM (i.e., higher reliability) and/or decreasing MDT (i.e., faster turn- 
around time). Thus the two key issues to improve weapon systems readiness are reliability/quality 
improvement and cycle-time reduction. Using Little's formula (Little, 1961), it is obvious that 
cycle time reduction results in pipeline inventory reduction. Cycle time reduction in the DoD 
logistics channel (military depots, intermediate-level maintenance, inventory control points, supply 
centers, etc.) reduces the number of weapons systems and components in the repair pipeline, thus 
more weapon systems are available at the fleets/fields, which is translated to not only higher 
readiness, but also savings in inventory cost. 
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) applications to military depots and inventory control 
points can provide insights into improving logistics cycle times significantly . These efforts in cycle 
time reduction will bring in not only inventory reduction but customer confidence in the system, thus 
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will help change management culture.  Our follow-up research will concentrate on these M&S 
applications DoD logistics systems to improve inventory management. 
2. Better Performance Measures and Incentives 
DoD's current mission, organizational structure, and incentive/reward systems all promote 
behaviors that encourage excess inventory. Focusing on material availability at any cost without 
regard for high inventory levels leads to ambiguous objectives (local versus global effectiveness). 
DoD must review all the factors including organization structure, evaluation and incentive/reward 
systems, and take drastic initiatives that will lead to system improvement. 
3. Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) 
DoD is on the right track with many initiatives in JTAV, yet DoD should expedite current 
initiatives to provide total asset visibility throughout the DoD supply system. Systems such as JTAV 
are essential to restoring customer confidence and improving inventory management efficiency. It 
is impossible to effectively manage inventory without knowing exactly which items are held and 
where they are stored. JTAV is the enabler to improving customer confidence in the supply system's 
ability to support deployed forces. 
4. Streamlining Contracting Regulations 
This cause of excess inventories is largely self-inflicted. The government has the ability to 
change its contracting regulations and policies to reduce the generation and retention of excess 
inventory. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 reduced some of the 
burdensome requirements of government contracting, making it easier to buy quality products and 
develop long-term relationships by considering past contractor performance. Prime Vendor and 
Direct Vendor Delivery are two more examples of contracting initiatives currently underway that 
can reduce inventory. 
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5. Standardization of the Definition of the Definition of Excess Inventory 
All four armed services and DLA use a different definition of excess inventory. The Navy 
definition is a protection level plus eight years consumption at current rates. The Army uses a 
protection level plus one economic order quantity (EOQ). DLA uses six years consumption at 
current rates with no protection levels. The Air Force and Marine Corps definitions are different 
from all of the above. 
In addition to differing on the number of items considered excess, the services also differ on 
the valuation of these items. Sometimes a service uses the current purchase price, sometimes the 
original purchase price, and at other times the salvage value. Standardizing the definition of excess 
and its method of valuation would enable consistent measurement of total DoD excess inventory, 
and provide a benchmark for future improvements. 
6. Better Coordination Between Program Managers and Inventory Managers 
Better coordination between the weapons systems program managers and inventory managers 
might avoid the generation of some excess inventories. For example, it is important that program 
managers keep item managers informed immediately of design changes that might affect current 
procurement. Also, as program offices usually know the very latest information concerning when 
and the rate at which a weapons system will be phased out, getting this information to item managers 
quickly might reduce or avert procurement actions. If program offices know of reliability 
improvements that should reduce demand, inventory managers should be informed. By working 
together, these two groups can eliminate the deleterious impact their actions sometimes have upon 
each other. 
7. Greater Reliance on Contractor Support, Privatization, and Outsourcing 
Excess caused by poor estimates of support required for initial procurement can be alleviated 
by making the contractor responsible for all parts support for the first several years after a weapons 
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system introduction. This decision to rely on the contractor must take into account the national 
security risk involved in depending on someone else to support a DoD weapons system. 
Privatization and outsourcing of certain activities are viable options that will lead to 
competition and improve efficiency. However careful cost-benefit analyses are necessary since 
privatization and outsourcing may change infrastructure of DoD logistics system. 
8. Congressional Review of the National Stockpile 
The National Stockpile was created years ago to ensure the self-sufficiency of the U.S. in 
wartime. Since that time, warfare has changed radically and the U.S. is now dependent on truly 
global trade to support its interests. Meanwhile, the National Stockpile has remained largely 
unchanged. It holds some items that are no longer critical to national security, while there may be 
other items not currently held that should be. A comprehensive review by Congress is in order. 
-26- 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While DoD inventory and logistics management practices have remained largely unchanged, 
the commercial sector has completely changed its view of logistics and how logistics contributes to 
profitability. As a result, businesses have slashed their on-hand inventories, improved their 
distribution systems, and achieved significant cost savings. 
Although commercial logistics operations resemble the military's in many ways, simply 
training in commercial practices without understanding fundamental differences between the 
commercial operations and military operations will not change DoD inventory management culture. 
DoD's current mission, organizational structure, evaluation, and reward systems promote excess 
inventory. Focusing on material availability at any cost without regard for high inventory levels 
leads to ambiguous and conflicting objectives. DoD must review all the fundamental factors of 
inefficiency including organizational structure, evaluation, and incentive/reward systems, and take 
drastic but innovative initiatives that will lead to system improvements. DoD should not expect 
inventory managers to accomplish these tasks. Many DoD rules and regulations discourage inventory 
managers to conduct such tasks. The problem is a leadership issue, and the solution must be a top- 
down approach. 
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